

Cooperative Border Monitoring Opportunities for the Global Partnership

The United States National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Second Line of Defense Program (SLD) is a capacity building effort that directly contributes to a defense in-depth strategy to combat nuclear and radiological smuggling by providing additional layers of nuclear security to the first line of defense protection of nuclear materials and facilities. SLD supports building radiation detection capacity in partner countries to enhance border control and law enforcement measures to deter, detect and interdict the illicit movement of such materials.




SLD has successful partnerships with over fifty countries to implement radiation detection systems. This includes deploying equipment, training and sustainability measures at land border crossings, airports, feeder seaports and major container seaports (megaports). In response to the evolving threat, SLD has also deployed mobile radiation detection vans with nine of these same partner countries, teaming with their law enforcement competencies to build and sustain measures applied at interior points and in response to information alerts.

The SLD Program routinely collaborates with partner countries, Global Partnership (GP) countries, the European Commission (EC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under the auspices of the Border Monitoring Working Group (BMWG), SLD, EC and IAEA coordinate implementation and training activities in order to avoid duplicate efforts and extend the impact of their finite resources.

Collaboration Opportunities for Global Partnership

Despite the marked progress achieved by these coordinated international efforts, the global nuclear detection architecture is incomplete and the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials



persists. As the Global Partnership considers future plans to support global radiation detection and interdiction capacity, SLD invites member countries to consider developing partnerships to capitalize on SLD's deployment competencies and experiences. This process would include collaborative work to identify current threats and radiation detection gaps, and develop approaches for program implementation.

SLD Support Options

- Direct funding of SLD by Global Partnership member countries
- Facilitate cost sharing arrangements among government organizations and commercial entities
- Technical exchange of SLD design, construction and training methodologies and materials

One possibility is for Global Partnership countries to provide funds directly to SLD, as many have done in the past, for work in specific countries. GP partners can thus leverage SLD agreements, relationships, technical expertise, construction contracts, and sustainability support. The benefits to GP members of this approach include faster, more cost effective equipment installations, proven assessment and design processes, standardized site designs for land border crossing, airport and seaport, fully integrated sustainability development tools, and standing maintenance training and exercise programs. The inherent transparency, proven efficiencies and demonstrated results should be attractive to GP members.

Tight budgets may prevent a single funding entity from engaging a full nuclear security deployment in a specific port or country. In such instances, cost sharing among commercial stakeholders and government organizations may be most practical. Based on existing relationships with relevant stakeholders and a thorough understanding of the requisite commitments for a successful deployment, SLD can support GP facilitation of cost sharing arrangements.

Alternatively, SLD can provide information on strategic priorities and technical support to Global Partnership members who wish to carry out this important work themselves. Technical materials, methodologies and best practices associated with design, construction, conduct of operations, training, maintenance and management of a radiation detection system are assembled in a comprehensive kit that third parties can use as a practical guide to their implementation of nuclear security measures.

The key point is to ensure that investments already made by the United States or any other GP member are not wasted because border work is only partially completed, and that efforts continue to ensure a robust detection architecture against illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials.

In 2012 at the summit in Seoul, many nations made commitments to prevent the grave threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The United States NNSA SLD program stands ready to share with the international community its deployment competencies and experiences.

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